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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-2950 
_____________ 
 
FLORENCIO VAZQUEZ, 
   Appellant 
    
 v. 
 
CITY OF ALLENTOWN;  
ANDREW HOLVECK;  
MAURICE FLOWERS-WILLIAMS;  
MATTHEW DIEHL  
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civ. No. 5-14-cv-05891) 
District Judge: Honorable Edward G. Smith 
__________________________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a): 
September 16, 2016  
___________________________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  May 9, 2017) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge: 
                                                 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Plaintiff-Appellant Florencio Vazquez appeals several District Court rulings 
denying the admission of certain evidence at trial and also appeals the District Court’s 
grant of Defendants’ Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law.  We conclude that 
the District Court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the evidence.  We also 
conclude that the District Court properly granted Defendants’ motion for judgment as a 
matter of law.  Thus, we will affirm.   
I.  Background 
 This § 1983 suit arises out of Vazquez’s allegations of excessive force against the 
City of Allentown and three Allentown police officers (collectively “Defendants”).  The 
relevant portions of Vazquez’s complaint are as follows:  while Vazquez was “lawfully 
sitting on the front stairs of a business,” (Compl. ¶ 6) Allentown officer Andrew Holvek 
“leaped toward [him], grabbed [his] arm, and forcefully removed [his] hand from [his] 
pocket.”  (Compl. ¶ 10.)  Then, Holvek “forcefully pull[ed] [him] down the steps,” at 
which point Holvek and “several other City of Allentown police officers . . . beat [him] 
with their fists over a period of several minutes.”  (Compl. ¶ 12.)  The incident caused 
“severe injuries to [Vazquez’s] face and body.”  (Id.)  The Complaint alleged one count 
of excessive force and a Monell claim.1  
                                                 
1 Vazquez withdrew his Monell claim before trial.  He also dismissed his claims 
against the City of Allentown.  
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 After unsuccessful attempts at settlement, the parties prepared for trial.  In their 
pre-trial memoranda, both Vazquez and Defendants listed the three defendant police 
officers as potential witnesses.  Trial began on August 3, 2015.  Of relevance here, during 
proceedings on this date, Defendants requested that Vazquez be precluded from testifying 
during his case-in-chief because he failed to appear on time and remain at his properly 
noticed deposition.  The Court declined to impose this as a sanction.  Vazquez’s counsel, 
Richard J. Orloski, first expressed unwillingness to preclude Vazquez from testifying but 
later agreed because Defendants apparently agreed to stipulate to the admission of 
photographs depicting Vazquez’s injuries.  The exchange is as follows:  
[Defendants]:  I would ask that the Plaintiff, as a result of 
Friday’s failure to appear and testify, that he be precluded 
from testifying during his case-in-chief. . . . 
THE COURT:  Well, . . . I’m not inclined to grant that 
sanction.  But[,] Mr. Orloski, what is your position with 
respect to [this] request?  
[Orloski]:  I need to authenticate the photographs.  By 
authenticating the photographs I think I could try the case 
without him, but I don’t want to be committed to it at this 
point ‘cause I don’t know—are [Defendants] going to agree 
to the photographs coming in? 
…. 
[Defendants]:  I believe we’ve stipulated to the photographs.  
…. 
[Orloski]:  Okay, and now—well, if I get that in, I’m 99 
percent sure I wouldn’t call him . . . .  
…. 
THE COURT:  . . . . So if the defense will stipulate to the 
admissibility of the pictures, the Plaintiff will stipulate that 
they are precluded from calling Mr. Vazquez in their case-in-
chief?  
[Orloski]: That I—that we won’t call him?  
THE COURT: Right?  
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[Orloski]: Yeah, I think we can live with that, Your Honor.   
 
App. 87a–89a.  
 
 On August 4, 2015, Defendants filed a motion styled “Trial Brief Re: Compelled 
Attendance.”  D. Ct. Docket No. 65.  In the motion, Defendants stated: “Plaintiff’s 
counsel never served any subpoena to compel Defendants to attend trial, and made no 
attempt to communicate with Defendants’ counsel in order to secure Defendants’ 
appearance.”  Defs’ Trial Br. at 1.  The upshot of Defendants’ motion was that under the 
Local Rules of Civil Procedure, because they were not subpoenaed, trial could not be 
delayed due to their absence, and Defendants were not required to appear.    
 Presentation of evidence began on August 4, 2015.  Vazquez’s case-in-chief 
appeared to rely on presentation of the following evidence:  the testimony of Defendants; 
video footage of the incident; screenshots of the video footage; and photographs 
purporting to depict his injuries.  As explained above, Vazquez and Defendants stipulated 
to the admission of the photographs taken of Vazquez that showed Vazquez’s injuries.   
 But Vazquez had difficulties presenting the rest of the evidence.  For one, the 
police officers did not appear at trial and Vazquez had not subpoenaed them.  Vazquez 
requested a stay of the proceedings in order to secure the attendance of the police 
officers.  The District Court denied this request because Defendants had not been 
subpoenaed.  Further, the video footage and screenshots were not authenticated, and 
Vazquez failed to present any witnesses to provide authentication.     
 Despite these issues, trial continued.  Upon Vazquez’s request, and over 
5 
 
Defendants’ “strong objection,” App. 166a, the District Court allowed Vazquez to admit 
designated portions of Defendants’ depositions in lieu of their in-court testimony.  The 
District Court also allowed Vazquez to present video footage of the incident, on the basis 
that it did not need to be authenticated because Defendants had produced the footage 
during discovery.  The District Court confessed that allowing the admission of the 
footage was a “close call,” and that he did so “with great hesitation,” App. 123a, relying 
on “case law from the 9th Circuit and the 5th Circuit that seem[ed] to permit the 
document to be authenticated as a result of representations made by the Defense and the 
fact that it was provided by the Defense.”  Id.  However, the District Court refused to 
admit the screenshots from the video.     
 After the presentation of evidence, Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of 
law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which the District Court granted.  The 
District Court reversed its prior decision to admit the video into evidence, stating “I do 
believe that my original ruling is not in accordance with Third Circuit precedent.”  App. 
220a.  Having denied the admission of all of Vazquez’s evidence except the deposition 
excerpts and the photographs showing Vazquez’s injuries, the trial court concluded that 
Vazquez had insufficient evidence to prove excessive force. 
 Vazquez now appeals.  He asserts various challenges to the trial court’s decision to 
deny the admission of the evidence.  These challenges are in service of his larger 
assertion that the District Court erroneously granted judgment as a matter of law.  We 
review his arguments below.  
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II.  Standard of Review2 
 Our review of a judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 50(a) is plenary, and we must apply the same standard as the District Court. 
Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 63 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 
89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996)); Beck, 89 F.3d at 971.  A Rule 50(a) motion for 
judgment as a matter of law should be granted only if, “viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no question of material fact for the jury 
and any verdict other than the one directed would be erroneous under the governing law.”  
Id. (quoting Beck, 89 F.3d at 971).  
 We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 251 (3d Cir. 2010).  “[W]e require that evidence be 
authenticated before it can be admitted.”  Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 236 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 901(a)).  To authenticate, a “proponent must produce 
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”  
Fed. R. Evid. 901(a).   
                                                 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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III.  Analysis 
1.  Evidentiary Claims   
 Vazquez’s first argument is that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing 
to stay the trial to allow him to locate Defendants and secure their appearance at trial.  
This argument relies on Vazquez’s interpretation of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
Local Rules of Civil Procedure, which preclude delay of trial where a witness is not 
present unless the witness is subpoenaed or if “it is shown that the witness or witnesses 
were in attendance at the time and departed without leave.”  E.D. Pa. R. Civ. P. 45.1; 
43.1.1.  Vazquez believes that these rules are inapplicable because they apply to 
“witnesses, not parties,” and Defendants are parties.  Appellant’s Br. 19.  Thus, Vazquez 
maintains, “[i]n the interest of justice . . . the trial court ought to have compelled the 
appearance of the three Defendants.”  Id. at 20.       
 The plain terms of Local Rule 45.1 contradict Vazquez’s theory that the Court 
would have been able to permit a stay.  Under Local Rule 45.1, “[n]o trial shall be 
continued on account of the absence of any witness unless a subpoena for the attendance 
of such a witness has been served at least seven (7) days prior to the date set for trial.”  
E.D. Pa. R. Civ. P. 45.1.  In other words, the District Court was squarely prohibited from 
granting Vazquez the continuance he desired.  And, while Defendants are parties, they 
are also witnesses.  Witness, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining witness as 
“[s]omeone who sees, knows, or vouches for something.”).  Thus, the District Court did 
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not abuse its discretion in refusing to delay trial.  
 Vazquez launches an alternative argument regarding Defendants’ failure to 
appear:  he argues that because Defendants did not appear, the trial court was permitted to 
include an “adverse inference” charge in its jury instructions.  We disagree.  While we 
have stated that “the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties 
to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered 
against them,” Rad Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 808 F.2d 271, 274 (3d Cir. 
1986) (internal quotation marks omitted), we have not gone so far as to construe this 
principle to apply to parties who did not “refuse to testify” but rather did not appear at 
trial and were not subpoenaed.  The District Court told Vazquez: “because [Defendants] 
were available by subpoena, they’re not absent.  If you had subpoenaed them and they 
weren’t here, that might be a different story.”  App. 219a.  There was no controlling 
authority requiring the Court to apply an adverse inference, and the Court’s decision to 
reject application of the inference was reasonable given that Defendants were not 
subpoenaed.  We find no abuse of discretion.3   
 Next, Vazquez challenges the District Court’s refusal to admit into evidence video 
footage of the incident.  As noted above, the District Court first allowed the video to be 
admitted “with great hesitation,” relying on “case law from the 9th Circuit and the 5th 
                                                 
3 Further, it is problematic for Vazquez to now demand this charge for at least two 
reasons:  one, Vazquez failed to remain at a scheduled deposition and the Court did not 
apply the charge in that instance and two, the Court, in an apparent effort to provide a 
remedy to Vazquez given Defendants’ failure to appear, took the unorthodox approach of 
allowing admission of portions of Defendants’ depositions.       
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Circuit that seems to permit the document to be authenticated as a result of 
representations made by the Defense and the fact that it was provided by the Defense.”  
App. 123a.  However, the District Court later reversed this decision, stating “I do believe 
that my original ruling is not in accordance with Third Circuit precedent.”  App. 220a.  
The Court also concluded that the footage could not otherwise be authenticated because 
Vazquez did not prove that the individuals in the video were in fact the defendant police 
officers.     
 Vazquez opines that the Court’s subsequent ruling was in error because 
authenticity turns on whether “the evidence is what it claims to be.”  Appellant’s Br. 22. 
Vazquez is correct that authentication serves the function of proving that evidence is 
what the proponent claims it is; however, a proponent must follow “appropriate methods 
of authentication.”  See United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2013).  For 
example, a proponent can provide “[t]estimony of a [w]itness with [k]nowledge . . . that 
an item is what it is claimed to be,” or “[e]vidence describing a process or system and 
showing that it produces an accurate result.”  Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1), (9).  Here, Vazquez 
could have provided testimony of Defendants to show that they were in fact the 
individuals depicted in the video, or provided testimony of the person who created the 
video.  He did not, nor did he follow any other appropriate methods of authentication.  
The District Court’s decision to preclude admission of the video footage was not an abuse 
of discretion given Vazquez’s presentation of virtually no testimony in support of 
authentication.   
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 Vazquez argues in the alternative that, despite his failure to authenticate, “[w]here 
Defendants produced the video as part of discovery, they cannot object to its 
authenticity.”  Appellant’s Br. 22.  Although we have stated that documentary evidence 
“produced by [a party] in answer to an explicit discovery request . . . while not 
dispositive on the issue of authentication, is surely probative,” McQueeney v. Wilmington 
Tr. Co., 779 F.2d 916, 929 (3d Cir. 1985), it does not follow that everything produced in 
discovery is unconditionally authenticated.  We agree with the District Court that to adopt 
so broad a rule would “put counsel in a position of . . . hav[ing] to be careful [about] what 
[is] provide[d] in discovery for fear it’s going to be interpreted as an admission that . . . 
[it] is relevant and probative on a fact.”  App. 197a.  The District Court reasonably 
concluded that Vazquez’s inability to elicit testimony identifying Defendants in the video 
militated against authentication, notwithstanding the fact that the Defendants produced 
the video in discovery.   
 Next, Vazquez takes issue with the District Court’s refusal to admit the 
screenshots of the video.  Vazquez argues that these stills were “twice authenticated:  1) 
by coming directly from the video which was now in evidence; and 2) the photographs 
were identified by the deponents.”  Appellant’s Br. 26.   
 Vazquez’s first point misses the mark—the District Court’s decision to not admit 
the screenshots was based on Vazquez’s failure to show that the screenshots came from 
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the video.4  The statements in his Opening Brief and to the District Court that the stills 
“c[ame] from the video” are insufficient to prove this for authentication purposes.      
 Vazquez’s second point also does not indicate an abuse of discretion.  Although 
Vazquez confronted Defendants with the screenshots during their deposition, the District 
Court found relevant that Defendants were not asked to identify themselves in the 
screenshots, and that the screenshots were referred to as “exhibits,” creating confusion as 
to the particular items involved.  In other words, the District Court concluded that 
Vazquez put forth no “competent evidence to support authentication.”  See Turner, 718 
F.3d at 232 (emphasis added).  The Court summed up its concerns, stating that in order to 
admit the evidence without any additional facts tending to support authentication it 
“would have to ask the jury to make a determination that these were slide shots that were 
taken from the video because nobody else would have told the jury that.”  App. 208–09.  
Far from an abuse of discretion, this conclusion was a sound assessment of the 
difficulties underlying Vazquez’s failure to competently prove that the screenshots were 
                                                 
4 Orloski told the court during an off-the-record discussion that his secretary 
created the screenshots by taking them from the video.  Orloski’s secretary did not testify.  
Thus, because he did not personally take the images from the video his statements that 
they came from the video cannot provide authentication.   
Vazquez also appears to argue that the screenshots can be self-authenticated 
because they came from the video footage, and the video footage was already in evidence 
when he presented the screenshots.  He also points out that the timestamp on the 
screenshots are the same as the time indicated in the video footage.  While this is 
circumstantial evidence that could be probative of authenticity, the District Court found 
significant the fact that Vazquez presented no witness to testify as to who created the 
screenshots.  We do not believe that this was an abuse of discretion—without testimony 
as to the method of creation, there is simply no proof that the shots came from the video 
footage and also no evidence that the timestamps themselves were authentic.   
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taken from the video.    
 Thus we conclude that the Court did not abuse its discretion regarding the 
evidence relating to the use of force.  We next consider whether the competent items of 
evidence allowed Vazquez to survive Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of 
law.   
2.  Rule 50(a) Judgment as a Matter of Law   
 The “use of force is contrary to the Fourth Amendment if it is excessive under 
objective standards of reasonableness.”  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).  In 
assessing claims of excessive force, the court considers “the facts and circumstances of 
each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect 
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is 
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”  Id. at 205.   
 In granting judgment as a matter of law, the District Court observed that it only 
considered such a motion in the “rarest of circumstances.”  App. 220a.  It ultimately held 
that this was the “rare case[]” for which judgment as a matter of law was proper, 
explaining that “there is simply nothing that sufficiently places these three Defendants on 
that video or on the date and time in question.”  App. 221a.  It further explained that even 
if the video had been admitted into evidence, there was “simply [in]sufficient evidence 
whereby this jury would have legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find in favor of the 
Plaintiff.”  Id.      
 Given that we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
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requiring authentication in compliance with the Federal and Local Rules of Civil 
Procedure, there is little evidence in support of Vazquez’s excessive force claim as it 
relates to the force used.  Essentially, Vazquez’s evidence on the use of force was limited 
to the excerpts of the deposition that were read into evidence and the photographs of his 
injuries.  We thus consider whether this evidence sufficiently creates a “question of 
material fact” that makes judgment as a matter of law improper.  Lindsay, 742 F.3d at 63.   
 The deposition excerpts established the following with regard to the force used:  1) 
Officer Matthew Allen Diehl at one point laid on top of Vazquez and “had [his] knee on 
top of him,” App. 176a; 2) Officer Andrew Richard Holvek pulled Vazquez’s hand to 
take him off the stoop because he “didn’t know what he was reaching for,” and thought 
that Vazquez might be armed, App. 181a; and 3) that Officer Holvek twice “used a 
diffused pressure strike to his lower back,” App. 181a, which he did because “[Vazquez] 
was still tensed up.  He was still struggling with us.”  App. 183a.    
 Critically, the depositions revealed precious little about Vazquez’s behavior when 
he was approached, and it is the totality of the circumstances that guides an excessive 
force inquiry.  See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 208.  In order for the jury to find for Vazquez, it 
would have to conclude that the totality of the circumstances was such that it was 
unreasonable for Defendants to take the action that they did—i.e., it would have to 
speculate that Vazquez posed no immediate threat, was not actively resisting arrest, or, as 
the District Court noted, that the incident stemmed from “an unlawful arrest.”  App. 187a.  
There was nothing in the record that would have allowed them to do this, however, and to 
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the contrary, Defendants’ deposition testimony indicated that Vazquez acted 
“aggressively” and continued to struggle while officers attempted to apprehend him. 
 The photographs of Vazquez’s injuries also failed to support his excessive force 
claim.  The parties stipulated to the photographs and that they were taken within a week 
after the encounter.  In the light most favorable to Vazquez, the photographs would allow 
the jury to find that the injuries resulted from force used during the encounter, but they do 
not establish that the force was excessive.  The photographs, by themselves, only 
demonstrated that Vazquez was injured after the encounter; they showed nothing about 
whether Defendants’ actions during their interaction with Vazquez were unreasonable.  
As such, without further evidence, the photographs would not have allowed a jury to find 
that Vazquez’s injuries resulted from Defendants’ alleged use of excessive force.   
 In sum, the evidence admitted was minimal and much of it was unfavorable to 
Vazquez.  And Vazquez, due to the agreement forged with Defendants, was unable to 
take the stand to tell his side of the story.  Further, as the District Court reasonably 
precluded admission of the video and screenshots there was no objective basis on which 
to assess the incident.  Thus, there was no “legally sufficient” ground for the jury to find 
for Vazquez.  Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
IV.  Conclusion 
 We are troubled by what appears to be plaintiff’s counsel’s serious lack of 
preparation in this very important case—section 1983 is an invaluable device in aiding 
citizens who have suffered abuse from the state.  Unfortunately, there is simply no basis 
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for us to conclude that the District Court abused its discretion with regard to central 
pieces of evidence, and similarly no basis for us to reverse its grant of judgment as a 
matter of law.  Thus, and for the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court.   
